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International Development in Africa: An Assessment of the factors affecting Success and Failures

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Abstract

President Paul Kagame of Rwanda once lamented that "while more than US$300 billion in aid has apparently been disbursed to our continent since 1970, there is little to show for it in terms of economic growth and human development" (Moyo, 2009:28). Why has Africa experienced so many cases of failed and uncompleted or abandoned development programs? Why are some development programs successful while others fail? While there are numerous factors that could account for the success and failures of development programs in Africa, this paper explores the success and failures of international development (in selected number of countries in Africa) within the purview of public policy, policy process (e.g., policy implementation & evaluation); policy design, and corruption. Because a good evaluation provides the basis for sound policy making, the analysis of this paper enables us understand whether a specific development program has an impact, how large the impact is, and who benefited or why it ultimately failed. Furthermore, this paper goes on to revisit the historical context of international development; and suggest which strategies and programs can possibly work in which contexts, and use these lessons to inform the next generation of public policies for development programs across Africa.

Keywords: International Development, Africa, Success, Failures

1. Introduction

International development or global development can be defined in various ways. In the context of this paper, international development seeks to implement long-term solutions to problems by helping developing countries create the necessary capacity to provide sustainable solutions to their problems (Kiely, 2007). International development, therefore, implies the provision of support, services and programs such as healthcare, education, infrastructure, agriculture, economic and institutional development to the developing states (International Development—World Bank, 2014).

International development also includes the concept international aid and gender equality, but is fundamentally distinct from humanitarian aid and natural disaster aid. As Payne and Nassar noted, "Development is usually defined as significant and measurable economic growth and the emergence of social, economic, and political institutions." (Payne & Nassar, 2008:108). Michael Mecham contends, the process of development is not necessarily the same in all societies and contexts or in all historical periods—that development is "an ongoing process of qualitatively ameliorating social, political and economic change: that is, progressive change which improves and sustains the quality of life of human society" (Mecham, 2003:370).

International development began during the era of development. The era of development occurred in the 1940s and 1950s, particularly at the end of the World War II. The purpose of International development was to rebuild Europe, which was devastated during the course of World War II (Marshall Plan). As Bovard observed:

After World II, the Truman administration decided that a larger, more centralized effort was to revitalize the war-torn Europe. Economic planning was the rage in Washington in the late 1940s, and Marshall Plan administrators exported their new-found panacea. The Marshall Plan poured over $13 billion into Europe and coincided with an economic revival across the continent (Bovard, 1986:1).

International Development was further extended to the Third World Countries, including the African region, to reduce poverty and to minimize inequalities existing between Third World States and the First World. Again, this development was captured by Bovard as he noted:

The apparent success of the Marshall Plan led Truman in 1949 to propose his Four Point Program to provide a smaller version of the Marshall Plan for poor countries in Africa, Asia, and Central and South America. Truman declared that Point Four would be "a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the mprovement and growth of underdeveloped areas" (Bovard, 1986:1).

2. Definition of Successful and Failed Projects

Jones (1977) has characterized policy evaluation as a process of specification, measurement, analysis, and recommendation. The concept of success and failure of programs (in terms of the definition of success and failures) can be linked to the specific policymaker, donor agency, and/or policy area (or program) recipient and it can be defined, interpreted and executed differently by different policymakers and donors. For the purpose of this paper, a project could be considered successful if it meets Project Development Objectives (PDO) as measured by a set of outputs and outcomes specified in the project documents. However, if such a project does not meet or partially meets the objective and measurable outcomes are not achieved, then it is considered a failure, or a partially successful and partially failed outcome. It is up to policymakers to decide on what actually constitutes success and failure and how to assess it. It is important to state here that this approach is one plausible way, and that there are other ways as well. In this paper, defining and determining success or failure will require comparing the goals of the program to their outcomes, and measuring program impacts using key indicators such as return on investment, increases in economic growth, rising employment rates, decreases in the poverty rate, decreasing or increasing in maldistribution of wealth; and the degree of civic awareness and participation in a particular development program and or increases in the level of participation in agricultural development, etc.

Perhaps a given program could fail as a result of the fact that the original policy design was wrong, or because the design was never implemented. For example, Carl V. Patton and David S. Sawicki (1993) once observed that a program may produce an undesirable outcome because the underlying theory was incorrect. If a policy is inappropriate, if it cannot alleviate the problem for which it was designed, it will probably result in a failure no matter how well it is implemented. But even a brilliant policy program implemented may fail to achieve the goals of its designers

(Edwards, 1980). George Edwards also argues that successful implementation does necessarily guarantee a positive impact. There are different kinds of measures, techniques and approaches that have been used over time to determine and account for success or failure of programs and they provide different perspectives on a policy and call for different kinds of measurements at different times in the policy process (Cooper et al., 1998). Thus, there can be no standard approach to conducting an evaluation. Each evaluation has to be tailored to the specific project, country, and institutional context and actors.

However, the increasing growth of policy evaluation research has led to numerous approaches. Nachmias (1980) contends that there are three distinct but interrelated types of evaluation research that have emerged: (1) process evaluation, (2) impact evaluation, and (3) cost effectiveness and evaluation can be useful in determining the analysis of a policy area or development program. A brief description of the three approaches is as follows: Process evaluation is primarily concerned with the extent to which a particular policy or program is implemented according to its stated guideline or intent. It involves the periodic assessments of program functioning to detect deviations from goals, plans, and procedures. Often, it entails auditing the integrity of the program's financial transactions, accounting system, and the accuracy of records.

The significance of process evaluations stems from the fact that program goals may be drastically revised and even negated during implementation. Impact evaluation is concerned with assessing the effects of policies and, more specifically, with the extent to which a policy has achieved its stipulated objectives. To assess the success and failure of the impact of the program is essentially to ask how the conditions of the environment or the lives of the target population have been changed by specific policies or programs. Central to impact evaluation is the idea of causality, the notion that a given policy area is expected to produce a change in the target population in the direction of and magnitude intended by policymakers. Causality can never be directly observed; it can only be inferred. Cost-effectiveness evaluation as a tool can be used to evaluate any program or policy. It looks at not only expected impacts, but its costs as well (Rossi et al., 2004; Nachmias 1980).

Specifically, Cooper and his colleagues are concerned with the cost of projects relative to their benefits, whether the projects are effective, and if so, are they impacting the appropriate target population? In accounting for successes and failures of development programs, it would be essential to apply a combination of process evaluation, impact evaluation, cost-effectiveness (cost benefit techniques) as well as the World Bank evaluation tools for measuring results. This combined approach will help determine that failed or successful outcomes are indeed what they are as it provides the mechanism for checks and balances among the various methods and techniques. In terms of measuring the factors that affect success and failures, information generated from impact evaluations would be critical as they are designed to inform policymakers whether to expand, modify, or eliminate a particular policy or program and to determine success or failures. Such vital information can be generated and obtained by addressing the following questions: Does the program achieve the intended target goal? Should this pilot program be expanded or reduced? Can the changes in outcomes be explained by the programs, or are they the results of some other factors occurring simultaneously? Do program impacts vary across different groups of intended beneficiaries (males, females, farmers, region, and indigenous people) over time? Are there any unintended effects of the program, either positive or negative? (Rossi et al., 2004).

The concern of cost-effectiveness in evaluation research is with determining a program or a combination of program variables that maximize the desired objective for any particular resource or budget constraints. It involves integrating the cost considerations into the analysis and evaluation research designs. Other evaluation approaches used for accounting for success and failures includes those of the World Bank and that of Philip Cooper and other scholars. Since 1998, the World Bank has developed a policy on how it delivers aid to the countries it works with –placing more emphasis on evaluating the results of its lending programs in terms of how they impact on people and their needs, rather than by measuring input levels. The Bank uses evaluation tools that focus on the effectiveness of individual projects and more wide-ranging reviews, which look at the Bank's work in whole countries and whole economic or social sectors of operation (Liebenthal, Feinstein, & Ingram, 2004).

Some of the evaluations and measuring tools the Bank uses to account for success and failure or measuring results include the following: Implementation Completion Reports, Project Performance Assessment Reports, Impact Evaluation Reports, Inspection Panel Reports, and Country Assistance Evaluations. In terms of Impact Evaluations Reports, an assessment of the economic worth of projects and the long term effects on people and the environment is carried out. The Country Assistance Evaluations require the examination of the Bank's performance reporting on the country's conformity with the relevant bank Country Assistance Strategy after 10 years (The World Bank Group, 2008). In accounting for success and failures, and measuring results, Cooper et al. (1998) contend policy evaluations should ask how well a policy is working. They pose questions such as the following: What are the actual costs as compared with anticipated costs of policy? What are the unanticipated consequences, either positive or negative, that have come from the policy?

It is critical to determine how effective the program is in comparison with alternative interventions. Is the program worth the resources it costs? Is there sufficient evidence that this type of intervention works well in different contexts? Certain outcomes/impacts could take time to materialize. In some cases, this may mean that it is better to delay the final stage of the evaluation until these would show effects. In other cases, it may be better to choose a proximate set of indicators which are causally linked to the ultimate outcomes and are likely to show an effect earlier (Liebenthal et al., 2004). In our context, the development programs in question have already been funded and implemented.

Success and failure can also be determined and measured by assessing the specific outcomes attributable to a particular intervention or program using information generated from guided questions tailored for the programs. This can further be carried out by comparing outcomes (from information generated) where the intervention is applied against outcomes where the intervention does not exist. The goal is to verify the effect of outcomes that are caused by the intervention. Of all the competing views as to how to account for success and failures of development programs, the application of impact evaluation would offer a valuable tool. With an increasing demand for evidence of aid effectiveness, rigorous and effective analysis would be critical to trigger the increased rates of successful development and overall economic growth in Africa. To conduct this analysis, a review of the data on the five development projects for this paper is stated below:

1. Chad-Cameroon Oil pipeline to the Atlantic Ocean
   Donor: World Bank
   Cost: \$4.20 billion
2. Lake Turkana fish processing plant, Kenya
   Donor: Norwegian government
   Cost: \$22 million
3. Lesotho Highlands water project
   Donor: World Bank, European Investment Bank, & African Development Bank
   Cost: \$3.5 billion
4. Office du Niger, Mali
   Donor: France
   Cost: More than \$300 million over 50 years
5. Roll Back Malaria, across Africa
   Donor: Multiple agencies
   Cost: About \$500 million

NBC New.com, 12/23/2007; www. nbcnews.com & Associated Press , 2013

3. Analysis and Comparison of Development Projects

To better determine factors affecting the success and failures of development projects, it is necessary to briefly describe the backgrounds and conduct an analysis on these five targeted projects: the Chad-Cameroon Oil pipeline to the Atlantic Ocean; the Lake Turkana fish processing plant, Kenya; the Lesotho Highlands water project; Office du Niger, Mali; and the Roll Back Malaria, across Africa. The Chad-Cameroon Oil pipeline to the Atlantic Ocean project was funded by the World Bank at a cost of \$4.20 billion in Africa. This oil pipeline project was the biggest development project when it was completed in 2003. It was funded on the condition that the money would be spent with international supervision to develop Chad. However, President Idris Deby's government stated in 2005 that the oil money would go toward the general budget and the purchase of weapons, or else oil companies would be expelled. Furthermore, President Deby ended up spending the oil money on regime change survival and rigged elections. This is obviously a case of corruption and abuse of public office as demonstrated by the Chadian president, a recipe for failure of a development project.

The Lake Turkana fish processing plant, Kenya, project, funded by the Norwegian government at a cost of\$22 million, was designed in 1971 to provide jobs to the Turkana people through fishing and fish processing for export. However, the Turkana are nomads with no history of fishing or eating fish. The plant was eventually completed and operated for a few days, but was quickly shut down. The cost to operate the freezers and the demand for clean water in the desert were too high. This project remains a "white elephant" in Kenya's arid northwest. The failure of the Lake

Turkana fish processing plant can largely be tied to the failure of the donor or policy maker to solicit the input and suggestions of the local community, the Turkana people, who are nomads, having no interest in fish consumption or fishing occupation in the design of the project.

The Lesotho Highlands water project, funded by World Bank, European Investment Bank, and African Development Bank, at a cost of $3.5 billion, was designed to divert fresh water from the mountains for sale to South Africa for electricity began in 1986. However, the high cost of electricity for the beneficiaries and the diversion of so much water led to environmental and economic problems downstream. The development fund raised from selling the water was shut in 2003. The courts convicted three of the world's largest construction firms on corruption charges and the project's chief executive was jailed. Other un-intending consequences include tens of thousands of people whose lives were ruined as a result of the diversion. Unlike the Lake Turkana fish processing plant, Kenya, a project that failed to seek the input of the local community, the Lesotho Highlands water was entangled in corruption, an obvious cause of project failure.

The goal of the Office du Niger, Mali project, funded by France, (at a cost of more than $300 billion over a fifty-year period) in 1932 was to irrigate 2.47 million acres to grow cotton and rice and develop hydropower in the Mali desert. To implement this project, more than 30,000 people were forced to move to the desert to work on the largest aid project ever initiated by French colonial authorities. The project eventually failed as the African workers largely ignored French attempts to change their traditional agricultural practices, as only 6% of the region was developed by 1982, and as the infrastructure crumbled as a result. To remedy the situation, the World Bank took over the project in 1985 but demonstrated little success with rice farming. This is another case of the donor failing to seek and take into consideration the culture and input of the local population in the design and implementation of the project.

The Roll Back Malaria, across Africa project, was funded by multiple agencies at a cost of about $500 million. Established in 1998, the goal of Roll Back Malaria was to halve malaria incidence by 2010. According to the experts of this program, Africa needed $1.9 billion a year to slow down the disease. However, by 2002, donors have provided only $200 million a year. By 2004 the infection rate had risen to 12%. Experts concluded that donors rarely followed through with pledges and that some programs were subject to political considerations, such as what kinds of insecticides to use, whether to buy cheap generic drugs or how much people should pay for mosquito nets. The failure of this program can be tied to lack of adequate funding, lack of committed donors, and politics that stipulates who gets what, when, and how.

Based on the data available on the development projects and our concepts, principles, or assumptions and definitions of success and failures as outlined in our earlier discussion on what constitutes success or failures, it is undoubtedly clear that a variety of factors contributed to the failure of the five development projects discussed in this study. Such factors range from corruptive practices, inadequate funding, lack of the local community or recipient input or consideration to lack of committed donors as well as the design of the program

4. Other Factors Contributing Success and Failure of Development Projects

Additional factors examined in this paper that could contribute to success or failure of development programs include the following: public policy, policy design, corruption, and the policy process (implementation and evaluation).

Public Policy

Public policy is a field of theoretical inquiry with its own language and standards of judgment as well as a practical activity directed ultimately toward the preservation and alteration of the polity. Public policy does overlap with many disciplines such as public administration, economics, law, political science and government. It is an activity engaged in by public officials and other actors who make, execute, and interpret laws that aim at some particular public good. Moreover, individual citizens, as well as associations and interest groups, take stands on a range of issues concerning what laws, or policy, should be and participate in the process of creating public policies or laws. At best, public policy is a public activity that is concerned with the public good, private rights, institutional inquiry, and the moral condition of the citizen and of the citizenry. And "doing" public policy involves confronting the crises of the republic and engaging the participants of those crises in a serious conversation.

An issue generally gives rise to a public policy. Such an issue may be considered a problem on the public agenda and a policy may be put in place to resolve the problem. Public policy can be defined in a number of ways. For example, B. Guy Peters (1993) defines public policy as "the sum of government activities, whether acting directly or through agents, as it has influence on the lives of citizens" (p. 4). Similarly, Schneider and Ingram (1997) contend that public policies are the mechanism through which values are authoritatively allocated in societies. Schneider and Ingram, also hold the view that public policies contain designs recognizable in the context and in the practices through which policies are conveyed and have consequences.

According to Charles Lasswell (1958) in his book, *Politics: Who Gets What, When, and How,* "the study of politics is the study of influence and the influential" (p. 13). In this view, "what" implies policies advocated and enacted by policymakers, and "how" means the politics or political processes through which the polices are attained. Political science is also the study of public policy—specifically the description and explanation of the causes and consequences of government activity. An understanding of how policy choices are made requires attention of not only those who have power, but also a sensitivity for the nature of decisions and constraints on policy decision making.

A policy, therefore, becomes a public policy only when it has been adopted, implemented, and enforced by a government institution. Charles Lindblom (1959) argues, "policy is not made once and for all; it is made and remade endlessly. Policy-making is a process of successive approximation to some desired objectives in which what is desired itself continues to change under consideration" (p. 86). According to Cooper, Hidalgo-Hardeman, Naff, Ott, and White (1998), a policy is an answer rather than the answer because there can be many possible answers for a given issue. For example, when we speak of public policy with regard to the homeless, there is undoubtedly no one single answer. The same observation can be made about hazardous waste policy, education, and health care as well as other central issues of our time.

In terms of their contribution to American society, Thomas Dye (1998) argues that governments do many things, and that public policy is what governments choose to do or not do. Essentially, government regulates conflict within society, organizes society to carry on conflicts with other societies, extracts money in the form of taxes from the society, and distributes a great variety of symbolic rewards and material services to the members of society, among many other things. Over the years, as more and more Americans turned to government to resolve society's problems, government grew in size and public policy expanded in scope to encompass just about every sector of the American life.

In terms of the evolution of public policy field—the neglect of policy in political science was partly a result of the domination of the North American behavioralist traditions. Behavioralists attempted to understand the social structures that led to the form of voting, interest group interaction or type of party system under study. The political system was essentially looked at as part of a chain of events leading from social change to political behavior. With noticeable exception, (Lasswell, 1958), policy appeared as a minor event occurring at the end of the process. Thomas A. Birkland (2001) observes that while the study of politics has a long history, the systematic study of public policy, on the other hand, can be said to be a twentieth century creation. It dates back to 1922, when political scientist Charles Merriam sought to connect the theory and practices of politics to understanding the actual activities of government. Public policy evolved and continued through 1940s and early 1950s in the United States. It emerged as a dominant field in the late 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, and continues to the present. Public policy literature is appropriate for guiding and attaining the goals of this research because it can provide us with the conceptual and theoretical framework critical to the understanding and knowledge of international development agencies, development programs and policy decisions associated with the policy areas of this paper. A well-thought out policy that is effectively implemented can lead to a successful outcome while an ill-conceived or flawed policy can guarantee nothing but failure.

Policy Design

Designs made up of different kinds are structured into our everyday experience. Schneider and Ingram (1997) state, "designs are variously intended to fulfill educative, economic, aesthetic, personal, and other somewhat disconnected aims, some of which may be partially conflicting" (p. 1). Schneider and Igram (1997) also observe that policy design refers to the content or substance of public policy—the blueprints and discourses of policy in both its instrumental and symbolic forms; and furthermore, public policies are the mechanisms through which values are authoritatively allocated for the society.

In their article "The Analysis of Design or the Design of Analysis," in *Policy Studies Review*, summer 1988, Stephen H. Linder and B. Guy Peters (1988) called for a return to the more turbulent days of self-examination and introspection by questioning a major premise of contemporary policy inquiry, and arguing for a reorientation to matters of design within the policy sciences. They contend that while it is now fashionable to denigrate conscious approaches to policy choice, they are arguing that such approaches are necessary for further progress in policy analysis; and that it should be seen as a particular emphasis among multiple approaches to policy analysis. An emphasis on policy design in policy research forces the analyst to focus attention on different stages in the policy process more than does the more conventional emphasis on either ex post analysis of policy decisions (e.g. many implementation studies) or the analysis of specific, alternative strategies through methodologies such as cost-benefit analysis.

Discussing further about the importance of policy design, Linder and Peters (1988) noted that design generally serves as a metaphor for instrumental reasoning, the epistemological orientation of most inquiry outside the humanities devoted to the improvement of policy. To speak of design is to suggest rationality and rigor, first in structuring and then in overcoming problems. Schneider and Ingram (1997) again observe that policy designs are dynamic and policies fit into contexts. Essentially, both scholars suggest:

What may be an excellent design in one context, may well serve poorly in another. Abstract judgments of public policy are likely to be off the mark, and the analysis of designs requires acute sensitivity to context. Designs are nested inside one another and can be analyzed at many different levels. Policy analysts can study a specific policy design, even as small as one local program or one statue, or an entire policy area, or the policy designs of an entire society in one or more historical periods. (p.3)

Corruption

Although it is difficult to precisely define corruption, it is not generally difficult to recognize corruption when it is manifested. For our purpose, we would adopt the World Bank's definition because it is not only concise and broad enough to include most forms of corruption that the World Bank has encountered, but it is also widely used in the literature. The Bank simply defines corruption as the abuse of public office and for private gains (The World Bank, 1997). Public office is abused for private gains when an official accepts, solicits, or extorts a bribe. It is also abused when private agents actively offer bribes to circumvent public policies and processes for competitive advantage and profit. Like most other definitions, the World Bank definition places the public sector at the center of the phenomenon. Bribery also occurs in the private sector, but bribery in the public sector, offered or extracted should be our concern as well as the World Bank since the World Bank lends primarily to governments and supports government policies, programs and projects.

Corruption and Aid Development Programs

Transparency International (TI), the global coalition against corruption, contends that development assistance supports millions who struggle daily to survive; and that in 2006, donor countries gave almost $104 billion in official development assistance to lower-income countries, a figure set to rise to $130 billion in 2010 (Transparency, 2007). According to TI, ensuring that this aid is not diverted through corruption is the purpose of the 2007 *Transparency International Policy Paper* on poverty, aid and corruption. There is, therefore, increasingly an awareness of the development community in both donor and recipient countries that without countering corruption, aid is in danger of not reaching the poor or reaching only partially. The credibility of future aid will depend on the ability of the aid system to demonstrate that it can address corruption pro-actively and comprehensively.

In Africa and other Third World states that have weak governance and large amounts of aid, civil societies and the international community have warned about corruption for many years. Aid can fuel corruption, but aid can also help build capacity for anticorruption efforts. The concept of partnership between aid receiving and aid-providing countries is firmly embodied in the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC). And this calls for the promotion, prevention, detection, and sanctioning of corruption, as well as the cooperation between state parties (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2008).

According to Transparency International's report (2007), different forms of aid are generally associated with different risks of corruption. Below is a description of how corruption can be fused into the development project life-cycle:

- Budget Support and Programme Aid—Budget support is used by donors as a modality for supporting poverty reduction policies developed by the recipient government. It is directly channeled into the financial management, accountability and procurement system of the recipient country. These features are intended to strengthen country-ownership of policy and policy-making, to develop administrative capacity and to reduce the transaction costs of aid.

- Project Support—Corruption in project can occur at any stage of the project cycle and can involve public officials and private sector representative in the recipient country as well as aid agency staff themselves. These actors sometimes work in collusion with each other to divert aid resources. Risks of corruption can be identified in the following key areas in development: Project selection; Project design; Procurement; Implementation; Financial management; and Project evaluation, and a given project can fail as a result.

- Project Selection—Corruption can negatively affect the selection of development projects. Corruption can divert resources away from social sector and toward defense and major infrastructure projects. It may encourage the selection of uneconomical projects because of opportunities for financial kickbacks and political patronage.

- Project Design—The distorting effects of corruption on projects can take effect early in the project design phase. Project requirements may be overstated or tailored to fit one specific bidder. More generally, a corrupt system deflates the value of work performed in project planning because subsequent planning decisions do not depend on a careful assessment of needs and goals, but rather on the need to maintain cash flow from the diversion of development aid.

- Procurement—The risk of corruption in the procurement of goods and services needed for the implementation of development projects is particularly high. This can involve attempts by aid borrowers to limit competition via insufficient advertising, short bidding times or similar. It can also take the form of corrupt practices on the part of the bidders, like unjustified complaints or misleading bids. Collusion among firms or between public officials and bidders can also render competition ineffective, leading to contracts with underperforming firms at inflated prices.

- Implementation—Corruption at the project implementation stage can involve practices including corrupt contract amendments , over-billing or under payment, the provision of equipment or goods of lower than specified quality, as well as outright theft of materials, equipment or services. Expenditure leakage refers to the corrupt diversion of allocated project funding. This can lead to significant reductions in the aid received by end-users. In extreme cases, aid may only reach only those able to pay for it.

- Financial Management—Corruption in the financial management of development projects can include duplication of payments, alteration of invoices, lack of supporting records, ineligible payments, misuse of public funds or unauthorized payments.

- Project Evaluation—Corruption can distort the evaluation of development projects, thus ensuring the continued flow of development resources for potential diversion. Kick-backs can be given to persuade recipient government officials or aid agency staff to turn a blind eye to sluggishly implemented projects, unfulfilled contract requirements, undelivered aid and other instances of malpractice.

In September, 2007, the World Bank and the United Nations jointly announced that a system was being set up to help developing nations recover assets stolen by corrupt leaders that amounted to $40 billion a year (Hoge, 2007). Mr. Robert B. Zoellick, the president of the World Bank at the time, estimated that the overall cross-border flow of global proceeds from criminal activities, corruption and tax evasion was $1 trillion to $1.6 trillion annually, and that even a small portion of that could provide financing for much needed social programs. According to Hoge (2007), of the *New York Times*, President Zoellick noted that "the problem of stolen assets is most acute in Africa, where an estimated 25 percent of the gross national product of states is lost to corruption."

In colonial Africa, particularly during the struggle for independence, many African freedom fighters and leaders vigorously argued that the eventual control of the apparatus of the government and resources by indigenous elites would profoundly improve the welfare of the Africans and reduce poverty. However, after nearly a half a century of independence, most of sub-Sahara Africa is still significantly undeveloped and persistent poverty is no longer a secret phenomenon. Although some development scholars and experts link this problem to the colonization of Africa and circumstances beyond the control of the Africans, corruption is generally and widely blamed as a major cause for poverty and underdevelopment. In the case of Nigeria, a major constraint on Nigeria development has been the problem of massive corruption (Aborisade & Mundt, 1998). In their analysis of development and poverty issues in Nigeria, Aborisade and Mundt (1998) observed:

In trying to explain how Nigeria has achieved so little in the past twenty years, it is not enough to cite the usual constraints on Third World development. Those are real enough, and sufficient explanation for poor countries without natural resources, but they cannot explain the situation of oil-rich Nigeria. For that explanation, we must ask what has happened to billions of dollars in oil revenues since the 1970s. (p.199)

According to Toyin Falola (2002), African states have seized and reallocated the enormous revenues forthcoming from mineral wealth in such a way as to make sustainable development unlikely when the source of revenues exhausts itself, as it must. He cited the case of Nigeria, where the price of Nigeria's oil quadrupled during the period 1973 through 1974, providing the huge windfall of revenue which served to increase the rewards of rent seekers. The beneficiaries of this scam were usually the well-connected, the most vigorous civil servants and military officers, who have access to the resources. For example, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) recently reported that the problem of corruption in Nigeria is real, deep-rooted and severe. The UNODC (2007) stated, "recent investigations have found that the Abacha family alone looted \$5 billion. International newspapers, including the Financial Times, have reported that at least 20 more families have stolen and hidden similar amounts in overseas banks over the last twenty years." This situation has adversely affected development programs and economic growth in Nigeria and other African states. Corruption and abuse of power has become part and parcel of Africa’s economic and political landscape. It is no surprise as to why we will continue to witness development failures on a consistent basis throughout much of Africa if some drastic steps are not taken.

5. Policy Process: Policy Implementation (Program Implementation) & Evaluation

Public policy process is simply a process of making public policies. There are a number ways to make public policies. In the US context, one option begins with the legislative approach, in which administrative agencies play a central role with the participation of the congress and the president. In this approach, a basic legislation is usually drawn up, considered, and approved. Another policy -making option is the stage approach, which goes from issue emergence or issue identification, agenda setting, alternative policy selection (choice of policy tools to be used), adoption, implementation, to evaluation. A brief description of the policy process using the stage approach entails:

Stage 1

Policy agenda setting

Defining the problem, or identification of the problems, is among many issues that receive the serious attention of public officials. The policy agenda stage is the most difficult stage due to conflicting ideas and competing problems that require attention. These problems are usually advanced by policy makers, interest groups and other concerned individuals.

Stage 2

Policy Formulation

Development of pertinent and acceptable proposed courses of action for dealing with a public problem.

Stage 3

Policy Adoption or Enactment

Development of support for a specific proposals so that a policy can be authorized or legitimized.

Stage 4

Policy Implementation

Application of the policy by the government's administrative agency.

Stage 5

Policy Evaluation

Efforts by government to determine whether a policy was effective and why or why not; did the policy work?

(Anderson, 2000: 13)

In this paper, we will shed light on policy implementation and evaluation more than other stages of the policy process because of their relevance to the success and failure of development projects. Policy implementation is a key feature in the policy process. Thomas B. Birkland defines policy implementation as "the process by which policies enacted or adopted by the government are put into effect by the relevant public agencies" (Birkland, 2011:263).

Policy implementation is a key feature of the policy process. Policy evaluation, on the other hand, calls for evaluation and effectiveness of the project. It enables policy to gain knowledge of program impact, establish accountability, and influence continuation or termination of government activities. Several factors affect the success and failure of both policy implementation and evaluation, and some of these include corruption, inadequate funding, or flawed policy or program design, etc. Furthermore, policy implementation and evaluation are also associated with conflict, struggle among individuals and groups, officials, and agencies with conflicting and competing ideas, interests, values, and information on public- policy issues. All of the above issues, including the role of public officials, institutions, politics, the exercise of power, bargaining and compromise, and other factors do in turn adversely affect the policy process and subsequently the success or failure of development projects (Birkland, 2011; Anderson, 2000)

6. Conclusion

The phenomenon of failed development projects in Africa is not an unusual state of affairs, as clearly manifested in the projects we have examined. We began this paper with a description and historical context of international development. Based on our definition and concepts of success and failures in conjunction with the original goals and objectives outlined in the development projects in five African countries examined, it is our determination that these projects have woefully failed to meet the expectation of donor institutions and the recipient states. But how can Africa prevent the prevailing epidemic of future development project failures? This is still a challenging and fundamental research question that most development experts and institutions must grapple with given the increasing number of abandoned, uncompleted, and failed development projects that are littered cross many African countries. The following are some of our suggested strategies that can possibly minimize development failures and boost program effectiveness:

- Stable political systems (political stability)--pro-growth/development
- Political Institutions-(independent/autonomous)
- An end to Africa's endemic Corruptive Practices—Culture of Corruption still prevails
- Donor Institutions/NGOs Partnership with progressive African states
- Committed Donors/institutions—World Bank, USAID, and UNDP, etc. needed
- Competent & committed African Leadership with right set of priorities
- Local Ownership and Initiative (Local Community input); Local community empowerment;-less reliance on Africa's national governments
- Services of Independent Think tank organizations (Policy /Research Institutes)
- Appropriate Policy/development programs with the right policy design and implementation mechanism
- Impact Evaluation; traditional cost-benefit methods/techniques, etc.

Furthermore, development must begin from within, with committed African leaders and people leading the way, because development in Africa cannot be transplanted from a highly developed industrialized world. Development must also to be tailored to local community needs as this could help trigger economic opportunities and some sense of local ownership and nationalism among Africa's fast-growing populations. It is no secret to observe that nationalism, which has galvanized most of the Western world, including the United States, is literally absent in the context of Africa. There is also the need for Africa to embark on other economic strategies that call for less reliance on foreign aid. Aid dependency relationships with donor institutions are another dimension that may continue to contribute to development failure, declining economic growth, and poverty in Africa. This is largely because aid dependency kills incentives for growth and weakens innovative and creative initiatives.

There are also other attendant issues associated with Africa's dependency on international aid. For example, aid is usually tied to political, economic conditions and terms, many of which are detrimental to individual African states. Presently, the ratio of aid to GDP is quite high in sub-Sahara Africa (SSA), and so far, more than $300 billion in aid has been disbursed to Africa since 1970 (Moyo, 2009:28). An average African state received 13% of its GDP in annual aid with the exception of Nigeria and South Africa (Thompson, 2004). Yet, it is also true that there is no strong correlation between aid and economic growth (Eberstadt & Adelman, 2008).

While there are increases in aid, there are also corresponding long-term declines in per- capita output; and declines in macroeconomic growth in SSA as well. In view of the above development, we advocate for a vibrant private sector economic system in Africa, one that is not only open and diversified but also less dependent on oil and other natural resources. In addition, we urge timely investment of Africa's surplus revenues generated from oil, natural resources and minerals to boost development and economic growth; stronger emphasis on manufacturing/export activities; active and engaging civil society, rule of law, individual rights, and due process, etc. Of course, none of these measures will work if African governments and people fail to make adequate provision for support for accountability and transparency, political and institutional reform as well as leadership and cultural reform factored into the equation.

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